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ABSTRACT 
 
This study adds to the limited literature on residentially-focused special taxing districts 
by addressing three questions on crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans. 1) Do 
the districts share common characteristics? 2) Do they act as a tool to retain residents? 3) Do 
they represent what A.O. Hirschman would characterize as “exit,” “voice” or neither, and, as 
such, how do they effect the city’s potential for service improvement?  
The findings show that the districts tend to be wealthier and whiter, and to have higher 
homeownership rates and home values than the city at large. However, exceptionalities in three 
of the newer districts suggest greater diversification. This could represent a shift in the perceived 
role of neighborhood organizations in meeting residents’ service needs.  
This study also finds that districts act as mechanisms to retain and, in some cases, placate 
residents who might otherwise be influential constituencies demanding improved municipal 
services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special taxing districts, Crime prevention and security districts, New Orleans, Charles 
Tiebout, A.O. Hirschman 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cities across the nation are facing dire fiscal conditions. Government costs are rising, 
thanks in part to the increasing price tag for health care and pension benefits, while local 
revenues are plummeting. At the same time, the pipeline of dollars from the state and federal 
governments has dried up in the wake of the recession. As a result, many municipal governments 
are facing the tough decision of scaling back on the services they provide, raising taxes or both.   
In some instances, local governments have had to cut even seemingly basic public 
services, leaving private citizens and non-profits who still want those services to pick up the 
slack. In Obion County, Tennessee, for example the County Commission voted to expand 
subscription-based firefighting services throughout the county (Sisson 2010). Beginning in July 
2011, all fire departments in the area will require residents to pay an annual fee for their services. 
In Colorado Springs, Colorado, severe service cuts have forced the city to turn off one-third of its 
street lights, stop mowing medians and pull all garbage cans from parks (Patton 2010).  Private 
organizations and citizens have, in many cases, stepped in where government has scaled back. 
Citizens can “adopt a street light” on their block and have it turned back on by paying a 
donation. They can also adopt trash cans and medians. While perhaps extreme examples of the 
private provision of typically public goods, Obion County and Colorado Springs are 
representative of a larger phenomenon of private citizens choosing to fill local governments’ 
service gaps.  
Creating special taxing districts is one way for groups of citizens to provide themselves 
with additional or enhanced public services that the government may not be able to afford or care 
to provide. Special taxing districts are geographically defined districts in which members 
authorize the local government to levy additional taxes or fees on them for a specified purpose.   
Special taxing districts along commercial corridors, often called business improvement 
districts, are one of the more common and studied types of districts. Business improvement 
districts became popular in the 1980s and 1990s following a reduction in funding for urban 
economic development. In these districts, business owners join together to fund services such as 
promotion and marketing, landscaping and urban design, and enhanced street and sidewalk 
cleaning. While not as common, special taxing districts can also be created in predominantly 
residential areas. New Orleans has 15 crime prevention and security districts that are a prime 
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example of residentially-focused special taxing districts. Residents in these districts agree to tax 
themselves extra in order to have an increased police presence in their neighborhoods.  
Special taxing districts are a useful tool for business owners and residents who are 
unsatisfied with the amount or quality of services their local government is providing. The 
districts allow citizens to remain in the municipality despite their dissatisfaction. But special 
taxing districts are not without pitfalls. When exploring non-traditional options for providing 
public services and goods, it is important for policy makers and citizens to understand the policy 
implications and pros and cons of allowing groups of citizens to provide public services at the 
sub-local level.  
There is a substantial body of literature associated with commercially-focused special 
taxing districts. Much less research has been conducted on special taxing districts in 
predominantly residential areas, however. This study will add to the relatively limited literature 
on residentially-focused special taxing districts by reviewing and analyzing crime prevention and 
security districts in New Orleans. Specifically, it will seek to answer three questions. First, do the 
districts share common characteristics and, if so, do these characteristics distinguish them from 
other areas in the city? This question is motivated by Richard Briffault’s (1997) query of whether 
or not special taxing districts are, in practice, available to all residents who desire a more or 
higher quality of services, or if only wealthier neighborhoods have the resources to implement 
them. Second, as Leah Brooks (2007) suggests is possible of special taxing districts, do the crime 
prevention and security districts break the link between Tiebout sorting on taxes, public goods 
and municipal boundaries by keeping residents from leaving the city in search of a more 
favorable package of taxes and services? Third, are crime prevention and security districts an 
exercise in exit, voice or neither (Hirschman, 1970)? And, if they are neither, do they create what 
A.O. Hirschman (1970) terms “lazy monopolies”, effectively siphoning off and satisfying those 
who would otherwise complain about the quality of services and demand improvement?     
New Orleans provides an interesting case study on residentially-focused special taxing 
districts because it has a relatively large number of districts and because several of them have 
been in existence for more than a decade.  
This study will review and analyze the 15 crime prevention and security districts in New 
Orleans. It will compare characteristics of the districts to each other and to the city at large. 
Characteristics that will be considered include the amount district residents are charged and the 
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method of providing policing services, the demographics of district residents, and the 
homeownership rates and home values in the districts. Through targeted interviews, this study 
will attempt to determine if the option of creating and/or living in a crime prevention and 
security district has kept some residents from moving out of New Orleans, and if the option 
silenced their “voice” over the need for better or more effective security services.   
The study begins with a review of the existing literature in three areas: 1) public choice in 
the provision of public goods, 2) possible consumer responses to unsatisfactory service quality, 
specifically, the factors affecting the decision to leave an organization or voice concern, and 3) 
special taxing districts. It then outlines the methodology used to answer the three research 
questions and details its limitations. Finally, it reviews the findings of the study, discusses the 
results and provides conclusions based on them.   
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LITERATURE AND THEORY OF SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICTS 
 
A special taxing district is a geographically defined district that authorizes a city to levy 
additional taxes or fees on its members in return for a specified purpose. Special taxing districts 
are known by a number of different names and vary in purpose. Some districts focus on serving 
businesses; others serve primarily residential areas. Business Improvement Districts, also known 
as BIDs, are one of the more common types of special taxing district and are business-oriented. 
Downtown Development Districts are another common commercially-focused special taxing 
district. This study will analyze a type of residentially-focused special taxing district in New 
Orleans – crime prevention and security districts. 
Janet Rothenberg Pack (1992) defines special taxing districts as having three critical 
characteristics. First, districts are in one area of one city and all expenditures are restricted to 
within that area. Second, districts are organized and financed by their members, who can include 
property owners, merchants or voters in the area. To create the district, a majority of members 
must agree to pay a tax or parcel fee to support the district. Once the majority of members agree 
to self-imposed taxes or fees, all members of the district are required to contribute. Third, 
revenues are used to purchase supplemental services or to undertake capital improvements 
beyond those provided by the city.  
The use and structure of special taxing districts raises a host of theoretical and technical 
questions on a range of issues, including policy choice, governance, performance measurement 
and institutional design. Existing literature has explored these and other questions to a degree. 
Two primary bodies of literature in particular are germane to this study: 1) that on the economic 
theories on public choice, responses to declines in firms and organizations, collective action, and 
private government, and 2) that on the advantages and disadvantages of special taxing districts, 
their growth and effectiveness, as largely explored through case studies of business improvement 
districts. The first body sheds light on some of the theoretical questions surrounding the creation 
and use of special taxing districts. The second tends to be more empirical and provides insight 
into possible approaches for analyzing the effectiveness of residentially-focused special taxing 
districts and into the advantages and disadvantages of special taxing districts in general. 
This study will build on existing literature, generally, and the small cache of literature on 
residentially-focused special taxing districts, specifically, by providing a case study on crime 
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prevention and security districts in New Orleans. In reviewing New Orleans’ security districts it 
seeks to answer two questions. First, do the 15 security districts in New Orleans share certain 
characteristics and, if so, do these characteristics distinguish them from other areas of the city? In 
other words, are there characteristics that make certain areas more likely to consider and 
successfully pursue the implementation of a special taxing district? Second, does the existence of 
such districts have social and political consequences? This second question will draw heavily 
from political economy literature. 
The following review contains four parts. The first part discusses the history and legal 
authority for special taxing districts. The middle two review the pertinent literature. The final 
section discusses areas that could benefit from further research and that will be the focus of this 
study.    
 
History 
 
Jerry Mitchell (2008) identifies the historical antecedents of special taxing districts in the 
19th century use of benefit-based special assessments to finance new municipal infrastructure, the 
City Beautiful movement at the turn of the 20th century, and the trend towards suburbanization 
and special district governments later in the century. Special taxing districts became popular in 
the United States in the 1980s. The districts were seen as a means for property and business 
owners in fiscally strapped cities to join together to maintain a level of services they felt 
essential, but which the local government could not afford to provide. These services often 
included commercial district promotion and marketing, landscaping and urban design, more 
frequent trash pick-up, street and sidewalk cleaning, additional security and/or capital 
improvements.   
Still popular today, the purpose and role of special taxing districts remains much the 
same – making them a powerful tool in cities once again struggling to make ends meet. Jonathan 
B. Justice (553) sees the continued use and rise in special taxing districts as part of a larger trend, 
particularly pronounced in the U.S., toward “functional specialization and spatial 
decentralization in local as well as metropolitan geography and governance.” 
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Legal Authority 
 
Enabling statutes for the creation of special taxing districts are typically contained in state 
law. Statutes often lay out the types of districts allowed and the process for creating them at the 
local level, including who the members of districts are and by what majority they must approve 
of the district. Three additional provisions often found in enabling statutes are: sunset provisions 
requiring special taxing districts to be periodically reauthorized, provisions requiring 
maintenance of initial city-provided service levels and escape provisions for fiscal emergencies. 
These provisions protect district members and seek to ensure that the creation of a district does 
not reduce government investment and services in the area or overall.  
Differences in enabling statutes and the flexibility designed into many of them have 
resulted in considerable variation in the institutional design of special taxing districts and their 
relationship to local government (Justice 2009). Most commonly, special taxing districts are 
administered by nonprofit corporations, but with the power to secure a funding stream (Schaller 
and Modan 2005). They may also be freestanding public authorities, downtown partnerships or 
property management firms under contract to a voluntary board of district members. Regardless 
of their design, special taxing districts hover between the public and private domains. They are 
extra-governmental providers of public goods. As such, Justice (2009) notes that while a long-
standing tradition in U.S. local governance, special taxing districts are not readily accommodated 
within traditional political and managerial theories of public administration.  
While provided for in state law, special taxing districts are ultimately created by members 
of the proposed district. Depending on the type and structure of the proposed district, 
membership may be defined as property owners, merchants/owners of commercial 
establishments or voters living in the area. In deciding whether or not to adopt a special taxing 
district, a member of the proposed district considers the costs and benefits to them of the 
formation of the district. In other words, they determine whether the increase in property value or 
quality of life that will result from the creation of the district will be more or less than the cost of 
the additional taxes or fees to support it. The answer to that question will vary significantly based 
on the perceived problems with services and infrastructure in the area and with neighborhood 
characteristics.  
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Leah Brooks (2007) presents supply-side and demand-side hypotheses for why citizens 
elect to create special taxing districts. On the demand-side, she says that more heterogeneous 
cities should be more likely to supplement or opt out of government provision of services. The 
intuition behind this prediction is that heterogeneous residents may have more difficultly 
agreeing on public goods of mutual interest, thus creating the need or desire among certain 
groups to supplement local public goods.  
On the supply-side, she notes that even groups with common goals face collective action 
problems in the provision of public goods. One way to overcome collective action problems is by 
creating an institution that coerces membership. Special taxing districts provide a vehicle for 
coercing participation while allowing members more control over how revenues are spent than 
general taxation.  Brooks also notes that the age of a city has an impact on the adoption of special 
taxing districts, with older cities more likely to use them.  She suggests that older commercial 
neighborhoods (and therefore older cities) are more likely to experience larger positive 
externalities from and greater economies of scale in local public goods provision than newer 
commercial neighborhoods and are therefore more likely to benefit from special taxing districts. 
This is because older commercial neighborhoods have a larger number of stores in a small 
geographic area, and diverse ownership of the buildings housing the stores. In newer commercial 
neighborhoods, on the other hand, stores are typically located in shopping malls, strip malls or 
big box centers where a single developer writes a contract with the tenants to provide public 
goods. 
Although authorized at the state level and adopted by citizens, local government also has 
a role in the implementation of special taxing districts. The taxes and fees which finance the 
districts are often collected by a local taxing authority and then, depending on the terms of the 
district, used to provide additional services or given to the district for use in acquiring services. 
Special taxing districts represent a small cession of power for local government. However, in 
return, they offer a mechanism for near-free funding of municipal improvement. Special taxing 
districts also provide an alternative to government-sponsored and directed revitalization 
initiatives – such as Tax Increment Financing districts, Enterprise Communities, Empowerment 
Zones and local redevelopment zones (Brooks 2008).  
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Security Districts and Economic Theory 
 
There are a number of economic theories that shed light on the theoretical questions 
surrounding the creation and use of special taxing districts in general and security districts in 
particular. Theories of public choice, possible consumer responses to declines in organizations, 
collective action, and private governments are worth exploring in some depth. 
 
Public Choice 
 
Public choice theory assumes that people make decisions based on their own self-interest. 
Thus, they decide where to work and live, or what public goods to demand based on calculations 
of personal cost and benefit. Charles Tiebout (1956) took public choice theory a step further and 
said that people would move from one community to another in order to maximize their personal 
utility. In other words, they would move to the community that offered the level and quality of 
services they desired at the best price. Tiebout’s model states that through the choices of 
individuals, jurisdictions and residents will find equilibrium in the provision of local public 
goods in accordance to the tastes of residents, and will thereby sort themselves into those 
communities whose bundle of goods maximize utility. 
The positive potential in public choice theory and the Tiebout model is the idea that cities 
can proactively compete with suburban districts to attract businesses and consumers by offering 
an optimal set of tax burden, services and business conditions (Schaller and Modan 2005). 
Special taxing districts allow property and business owners even greater choice by allowing them 
to exercise Tiebout-like flexibility without the expense of voting with their feet (Briffault 1997, 
Brooks 2008). 
However, critics note that people’s ability to exercise choice is limited by imperfect 
information and mobility. Historical, cultural, social and political modes of inclusion and 
exclusion impede access to information, while local real estate markets force mobility through 
displacement (Schaller and Modan 2005). Since special taxing districts have the potential to 
collect revenues and to reallocate these resources within their geographical jurisdiction, it is 
important to consider the micropolitics of neighborhood boundaries – such as how they are 
constructed and institutionalized – when establishing the boundaries of special taxing districts 
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(Schaller and Modan 2005). Otherwise, districts may end up reinforcing political configurations 
that exclude traditionally marginalized residents and small businesses.  
 
Responses to Unsatisfactory Service Quality  
 
In his seminal work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organization, and States, A.O. Hirschman explores mechanisms – in addition to competition – 
that prompt recuperation in firms whose performance has deteriorated. Hirschman says that there 
are two ways for a firm to learn of its failings: 1) consumers stop purchasing its products, 
causing a dip in revenues and 2) consumers express their dissatisfaction to the management, 
causing them to seek possible cures to the complaints. The first mode is called exit; the second is 
called voice. Hirschman places exit in the realm of economics and voice in politics (1970, 15).   
   The exit option falls within public choice theory. The Tiebout model is a form of exit: a 
person is dissatisfied with the bundle of services and taxes in a municipality so he moves 
elsewhere. Revenues dip as a result. It is the dip in revenues, Hirschman says, that provides the 
potential for recuperation in the firm or, in the case of the Tiebout model, the state. For 
recuperation to occur, however, the dip in revenues cannot be too small or too large. If it is too 
small, it will not be sufficiently bothersome to cause the firm to act. If it is too large, it will 
weaken the firm to the point of bankruptcy and make recovery impossible. 
The voice option is when consumers or members attempt to change the practices, policies 
and outputs of the firm, rather than simply leaving. Hirschman notes that in comparison to the 
exit option, voice is costly and conditioned on the influence and bargaining power consumers 
and members can bring to bear, or think they can bring to bear, within the firm or organization 
(1970, 40). He says that the presence of an exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the 
development of the art of voice. The presence of an exit option can also diminish the potential 
for recuperation by creating what Hirschman calls “lazy monopolies” (1970, 59). The most 
quality-conscious consumers, who would also likely be the most vocal about deterioration, will 
leave first. Their exit may result in revenue losses too small to alert management to its failings 
while also weakening voice decisively by drawing away the most vocal consumers. Those who 
remain are therefore left with an inefficient firm. Hirschman (1970) notes, however, that loyalty 
to a firm or organization can postpone the exit of the most quality-conscious consumers. 
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Hirschman’s insights are relevant to the case of special taxing districts. However, it is not 
immediately clear which option – exit or voice – they represent. On the one hand, they allow 
residents to procure services from an entity other than the municipal government and, in doing 
so, satisfy and potentially silence quality-conscious consumers. Looking at the phenomenon this 
way, special taxing districts appear to be an example of exit. On the other hand, they do not 
cause the dip in revenue associated with exit, and residents living within the boundaries of a 
special taxing district build a constituency that may exert political influence on the larger 
municipality. In this view, special taxing districts more closely resemble an example of voice. 
This thesis will further explicate this tension. 
 
Collective Action  
 
Collective action is the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more than one person. 
Collective action can create problems in the provision of public services, particularly in 
heterogeneous groups. Theory suggests that the more heterogeneous the group, the less efficient 
the provision of goods, because there is less likely to be common agreement on which bundle of 
goods to provide. One solution to this problem is to decentralize the provision of public goods to 
smaller, more homogenous populations. The use of local government, rather than state or federal 
governments, to provide core public services, is an incidence of a decentralized approach to 
public administration. It is also a foundational theory for special taxing districts since it implies 
that decentralized decision-making about public goods and the private provision of them is more 
efficient than provision by local government. 
Another problem of collective action is that when large groups do find common purpose, 
they uniformly find it difficult to provide public goods for themselves because of the free rider 
problem. Free riders benefit from public goods and services without contributing to their 
provision. Two ways to overcome the free rider problem are to 1) exclude non-members from the 
benefits of the good, making the good no longer a public good, and 2) coerce all group members 
in to contributing to the provision of the good. The second mechanism is the essence of special 
taxing districts (Brooks 2008).  
With his economic theory of clubs, James M. Buchanan (1965) advanced the idea that a 
good can exist between the extremes of purely private and purely public and thus overcome 
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some of the problems associated with collective action. Buchanan posited that there are some 
goods and services, the consumption of which involves some “publicness,” where the optimal 
sharing group is more than one person but smaller than the infinitely large number that 
characterizes public goods. In other words, he writes, “the theory of clubs is, in one sense, a 
theory of optimal exclusion, as well as one of inclusion” (Buchanan 1965, 13). For these goods 
there is a benefit in both sharing it and limiting access to it. If there is benefit in a good existing 
in this in-between space, the quantity of the good, the size of the club sharing in its consumption, 
and the cost-sharing arrangements must be determined.  
Special taxing districts are, in many ways, a real-life execution – on a geographic plane – 
of Buchanan’s theory. They represent a negotiated space in which interested consumers can reap 
the benefits of both the collective and exclusive consumption of certain goods. The question then 
arises of what goods it makes sense to consume in such a way. For example, for purely public 
goods, congestion does not occur and thus there is not a benefit to limiting access to them. In 
terms of this study, the pertinent question is whether or not a benefit is or can be realized by 
consuming police services from within a club and, if so, if those benefits can be attained without 
a corresponding loss elsewhere.  
 
Private Governments 
 
Robert Helsley and William Strange (1998) define private governments as voluntary 
organizations that provide supplemental services to members who have paid for them. Private 
governments interact strategically with local governments, relieving the fiscal pressures on them 
while providing for improved services. 
Helsley and Strange relate their model of private governments to the literature begun by 
Tiebout (1956) and Buchanan (1965). Like Tiebout, they believe private governments allow for 
agent choice among competing expenditures and tax bundles (283). But rather than exerting their 
preferences through their choice of a community, in the private government model, agents reveal 
their preferences by choosing whether or not to join a private government and, therefore, receive 
supplemental provisions. The private government model links to Buchanan’s (1965) theory of 
clubs in the belief that exclusion can lead to an efficient allocation of public goods. Unlike with 
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Tiebout and Buchanan’s models, Helsley and Strange maintain that with private governments, 
agents always remain involved with the public sector.  
Helsley and Strange offer two examples of private governments: residential community 
associations and business improvement districts. While similar in concept to special taxing 
districts that are residentially-focused, residential community associations are often created 
upfront by developers as part of a planned development or condominium building. This differs 
from special taxing districts, which are collectively created by parties interested in selectively 
enhanced provisions. The authority for and enforcement powers of residential community 
association and residentially-focused special taxing districts also differ.  
Helsley and Strange (1998, 286) use a two stage game model to compare resource 
allocation with private government to resource allocation without private government. In the first 
stage, the public sector chooses whether or not a private government will be allowed to form, and 
it collects a membership price to cover the fixed costs of forming the government. In the second 
stage, the public sector and the private government choose levels of the collective good, and 
consumers choose whether or not to join the private government to maximize utility (286). Based 
on their analysis, Helsley and Strange draw two main conclusions. First, private government 
causes the public sector to reduce its provision of the collective good. Second, the welfare effects 
of private government are ambiguous and complex. In some cases, a private government 
increases aggregate welfare of members and nonmembers alike. In other cases, it can decrease 
welfare for the majority of the population, including its members. The introduction of private 
government is therefore not a Pareto improvement. To be a Pareto improvement the introduction 
of private government would have to allocate goods in such a way as to make at least one 
individual better off without making any other individuals worse off.   
Susan E. Baer (2000, 2008) analyzes Helsley and Strange’s model of private 
governments from a polycentric perspective. In doing so she applies the model to what she calls 
community benefit districts (CBDs). She defines a community benefit district as a private 
governance organization whose property owners, both residential and commercial, pay property 
taxes in addition to what the city levies to receive supplemental services such as safety, 
sanitation and economic development (2008, 52). She notes that CBDs are distinct from BIDs 
because BIDs traditionally have assessed or charged a fee only to commercial property owners. 
Baer’s CBDs are essentially residentially-focused special taxing districts. 
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Baer posits that private governments fall into the central debate between metropolitan 
reformers and polycentrists. Metropolitan reformers, she says, claim overlapping units of 
government, like CBDs, are a problem because they confuse consumers. Instead, they 
recommend that there be only one local government. The concept of polycentrism, in contrast, 
suggests that a system of ordered relationships underlies the fragmentation of authority and 
overlapping jurisdictions in the government of metropolitan areas. While reformers see this as 
creating an inefficient duplication of services, polycentrists argue that agencies offer similar but 
differentiated services. For example, private governments might offer safety services that are 
differentiated from what a city government offers as police services (53). Finally, reformers find 
small local governments to be undemocratic and discriminatory, a claim that may be extended to 
private governments. The polycentric model of governance, however, sees advantages in the 
homogeneity of small government. Namely, such units of government may be more beneficial in 
meeting service preferences and allowing individual users to voice their demands for their 
preferred bundle of services.  
Tiebout’s public choice theory is a major component of the polycentric model. So too is 
the idea that local government in metropolitan areas can be organized and reorganized to meet 
service preferences (Baer and Marando 2000, Ostrom et al 1961). The model further posits that 
the greater the number of governments, the more likely residents and businesses’ public good 
preferences will be realized. The growth of the suburbs has been taken as evidence of the 
efficiency of polycentric model (Baer and Marando 2000, Stein 1987, Dowling et al 1994). Baer 
and Marando (2000) apply the polycentric model to intra-city decentralization. Ultimately, Baer 
contends that the creation of private governments formalizes service level differences among 
residents and businesses within cities, because to receive supplemental services, property owners 
must join private governments, like CBDs or BIDs, and pay taxes or fees that are not paid by 
non-district property owners (56). Private governments allow residents who cannot or do not 
wish to move to another jurisdiction to stay in place and receive particularized goods and 
services. Baer writes that private government is, in effect, “an exercise of ‘voice’ rather than 
exit’” (57). 
In exploring the formation of the Charles Village Community Benefits District in 
Baltimore, Baer (2008) notes a number of concerns with implementing the polycentric model. 
One, expressed by some Baltimore city council members, is that CBDs would balkanize the city, 
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allowing white middle-income neighborhoods to engage in an elitist movement to obtain services 
and to exclude lower-income neighborhoods. Specifically, the council members feared that the 
creation of CBDs would be a subtle form of “gating.” This and concerns similar to it, derive in 
part from the difficulties low-income communities often have in forming and operating private 
governments and the belief that larger provision units will ensure that the wealthy pay for 
services for the poor.  
However, large provision units are not a panacea; they too can create inequities. 
Residents of poor neighborhoods may have even less voice about the type of services they desire 
than they do in small provision units. Baer posits that if all areas of a city, including low-income 
communities, are able to form their own private governments, while also receiving 
intergovernmental aid from overlapping large provision units, then a CBD’s benefits may 
outweigh its potential abuses. The question then is where exactly the threshold lies for benefits to 
outweigh abuses. In New Orleans any group of citizens can approach their state and local 
representatives about creating a private government. But is simply allowing all residents the 
option of creating a private government enough? Or are some groups of citizens more equipped 
politically and financially to actually form such governments and, therefore better able to access 
the benefits? Residents in 15 areas in New Orleans have approved a private government in the 
form of a crime prevention and security district. This study will examine whether the members of 
those districts are representative of the population of the city at large.  
 
Research Studies on Special Taxing Districts 
 
 Special taxing districts have been popular for 20 years, yet there is still limited agreement 
on their usefulness and limited research on their outcomes. Some scholars see special taxing 
districts as a good sign of civic engagement and as a way to efficiently provide public services, 
offer choice on the level of services and the cost of living within a city, and generate additional 
investment in urban places (Mitchell, 2008; Hochleutner, 2008; Justice and Goldsmith, 2008).  
Others fear that hyper-localism in service provision exacerbates existing social and geographic 
divisions and weakens local government (Justice, 2009; Justice and Goldsmith, 2008; Pack 
1992).  
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 Much of the empirical work on special taxing districts consists of case studies of business 
improvement districts and downtown development districts. These have provided a fairly 
extensive accounting of the advantages and disadvantages of such districts.  
 
 
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
While not a panacea for urban ills, special taxing districts can potentially provide a 
number of benefits. One potential benefit is an increase in property values in the area. A district 
with enhanced services may look better and appear to provide a better quality of life for its 
members. This, in turn, may make it a desirable place to live or work – increasing the value of 
property within the district and increasing revenues for the city. Another advantage of special 
taxing districts is the creation of a direct link between the funds collected for services and the 
provision of them. Members of a district pay an agreed upon amount for provision of a service. 
Revenues collected go directly towards funding that service. This makes costs transparent and 
adds a new efficiency to service provision.  
As discussed above, special taxing districts may also help solve the free rider problem 
that groups face in trying to voluntarily provide services in an area (Brooks, 2007; Pack, 1992). 
For example, everyone in a neighborhood benefits from neighborhood watch programs, but 
because such programs are voluntary, not everyone must contribute time or resources to them. 
The free rider problem results in some residents receive a disproportionate benefit and others 
paying a disproportionate cost. Special taxing districts solve this by requiring mandatory 
participation by all members following majority adoption of the district.  
Finally, while the existence of economies of scale is an important consideration in public 
finance theory, the services typically provided by special taxing districts are those that do not 
need or benefit from economies of scale, or are able to tap into existing networks (Pack, 1992). 
For example, enhanced security can be provided through the police department, which has 
already achieved economies of scale, or through a private security company. A private security 
company need not have the facilities, laboratories and diversity of staff required for municipal 
police departments. 
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Yet, for all of their potential benefits, research has shown special taxing districts to have 
some serious disadvantages and has raised concerns about their equity (Schaller and Modan, 
2005; Justice 2009). Schaller and Modan (2005) point out two fairly straightforward 
disadvantages of special taxing districts related to their mandatory participation requirement:  1) 
in some cases, the cost of the district may cause people who do not want to pay for it to leave, 
and 2) the cost may reduce profits and increase rents for business and property owners in the 
district, driving them out.  
Special taxing districts also raise a number of concerns about equity. Justice (2009) notes 
several of these, including the concern that ratepayers are paying twice for services – or, 
conversely, that they gain additional attention from local government at other taxpayers’ 
expense. Another concern is that special taxing districts may enhance perceptions of or 
exacerbate existing social divisions within a city by allowing higher income neighborhoods that 
can afford better services to opt into them, while leaving lower income services with basic or 
sub-par services (Pack 1992). This study will look at the possibility of this in New Orleans by 
comparing the household incomes in areas with crime prevention and security districts to those 
without them. Stratification from special taxing districts could erode a broader sense of 
community, lead to an every-man-for-himself feeling in the city, and increase resistance to 
general tax increases. If citizens are more willing to pay taxes that support their neighborhoods 
rather than the functioning of the city as a whole, the city could experience a reduction of 
revenues, hindering its ability to provide services, and creating a cycle that ends with wealthy 
areas paying for and having services and other areas not.  
 In addition, special taxing districts may shift problems and resources within a city, 
increasing problems in areas that cannot afford to or choose not to finance a special taxing 
district. For example, a security district may lower crime in the district by pushing it into 
adjoining areas. Understanding what drives the development of security districts – crime, the 
perception of crime or both – is important to understanding the possible effects of the district.  
Finally in the category of equity concerns, in some states voting power for special taxing districts 
is only given to property owners, even though renters indirectly pay the cost and reap the 
benefits of the district. Even in districts that offer non-property owners voting power, decision-
making power on the board is often weighted toward property owners.    
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In addition to concerns about equity, critics of special taxing districts raise concerns 
about the privatization of public space and public services (Justice 2009). Concerns about the 
privatization of public space include issues of governance as well as physical access to and 
control of space. For example, Justice (2009) notes that in some cases special taxing districts 
enable businesses to turn civic spaces into purely commercial ones. 
Two final disadvantages of special taxing districts are that they are insulated from public 
accountability and could increase resistance to general tax increases. Special taxing districts are 
removed from public democratic channels and accountability, and their decision-making 
processes are removed from public deliberation and challenge. They are structured as a means of 
managing space and providing services, rather than as democratic models of governance 
(Schaller and Modan 2009).  
In short, despite their benefits, special taxing districts can become problematic entities. 
Schaller and Modan (2005) note that they avail themselves of the public power to levy self-
imposed taxes and/or fees and to reinvest these exclusively in narrowly identified community 
endeavors for aims that benefit a narrow constituency.  
  
Room for Further Study 
 
Despite the prevalence of special taxing districts around the country they are not yet fully 
documented or understood in the literature. Briffault (1997), writing 15 years ago, questioned 
whether special taxing districts would spread to residential areas and, if they did, if the potential 
benefits of them could be extended to areas unable to finance supplemental services or 
improvements out of their own resources. In other words, if only neighborhoods with 
concentrations of wealthier residents would benefit from the option of special taxing districts, or 
if they would be universally applied. Since then, special taxing districts have cropped up in 
residential areas. The spread of crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans over the 
last 15 years is an example of the growing phenomenon of residentially-focused special taxing 
districts. But the question still remains of whether or not the districts are, in practice, available to 
all residents who desire more or a higher quality of services, or if only wealthier neighborhoods 
have the resources to implement them. This study will attempt to answer the question by 
comparing characteristics of areas with security districts to the city at large to see if the areas 
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with districts stand out. It will not, however, delve into the whys of any differences that do exist 
between the areas with districts and those without. Answering that question would require a 
survey of residents citywide.     
With the use of special taxing districts spreading, Brooks (2007) suggests that the 
districts may be plentiful enough to break the link between Tiebout sorting on taxes and public 
goods, and municipal boundaries by providing a tax and public goods choice not available from 
the city but within the city. This raises questions about the future role of local government in 
service provision and the distribution of what previously have been considered public goods and 
services. Through interviews with residents who approved crime prevention and security districts 
in the areas in which they live, this study will shed light on the rationale for the special taxing 
districts in residential areas. Did the option of creating a district keep residents from leaving the 
city in search of a more favorable package of taxes and services? If residents could provide 
themselves with all their services on a sublocal level – effectively replacing the city as the 
provider of public goods – would they?  
Finally, ostensibly groups of citizens participate in special taxing districts because they 
are unsatisfied with the level or quality of services the municipal government is providing. 
Hirschman (1970) presents two possibilities for consumers – in this case, citizens – facing 
declines in a firm or organization: exit or voice. Participation in special taxing districts, however, 
is not clearly one or the other. Brooks’ (2007) claim that special taxing districts allow for 
Tiebout sorting within municipal boundaries suggests that the districts provide some element of 
exit. However, they do not result in a reduction in revenues as would a total exit to a rival 
municipality, and could be seen as a means for voicing displeasure with the quality or level of 
services the government is providing. Special taxing districts existence in a space in between exit 
and voice raises questions about their effect on an inefficient government. Do they create what 
Hirschman (2007, 59) calls “lazy monopolies,” effectively siphoning off and satisfying those 
who would otherwise complain about the quality of services and demand improvement? If so, 
what does this mean for residents who do not live in special taxing districts? Are they left with 
subpar services or do they use voice to demand improvement? This study will begin to explore 
these questions through targeted interviews with city officials and residents living in some of the 
crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This study uses two approaches to answer the question of whether crime prevention and 
security districts in New Orleans share common characteristics and, if they do, whether these 
characteristics distinguish them from other areas in the city. First, it compares the structure of the 
individual districts – the amount district residents are charged, the amount districts spend on 
security and the method of providing policing services – using information gathered from public 
sources, such as Louisiana laws, annual required audits of the districts,1 media reports, and 
district and neighborhood websites. It also uses information provided by the Orleans Parish 
Assessor’s Office in response to a Freedom of Information request submitted on September 25, 
2012.  
Second, it uses maps of the districts and the city overlaid with social and demographic 
indicators available from public sources, like the Census, and from third party data providers.2 
The author used the online mapping tool Policy Map to draw maps of the districts. District 
boundaries were collected from Louisiana laws. The social and demographic indicators used in 
the study include household incomes of people residing in the districts, race of people residing in 
the districts, homeownership rates and home values. These indicators were chosen because 
information on them was available and because they provide a common demographic profile of 
the population of the districts. Policy Map was used to generate reports on the districts for the 
chosen indicators using Census data. To facilitate comparison of the districts, the author input the 
results for each indicator into Excel along with the citywide result.  
The second and third research questions this study addresses – whether security districts 
keep residents from leaving the city and whether their existence affects the city’s potential for 
improving its police services – are more qualitative in nature. To answer these questions, this 
study draws, in part, from interviews of six individuals associated with or knowledgeable about 
crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans. Interviewees were selected because of 
former or current leadership roles within crime prevention and security districts, past 
professional work with security districts, and on the recommendations of others involved with 
security districts in New Orleans. The author contacted the leadership of districts that provide 
                                                          
1
 The Louisiana Legislative Auditor requires the security districts, as quasi-public enterprises, to submit annual 
financial audits. These audits are available on the Legislative Auditor’s website, http://www.lla.state.la.us/ 
2
 Maps and community reports on the districts were generated using the online mapping tool Policy Map, 
www.policymap.com 
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contact information on their websites. Initial contact was generally made via email and 
occasionally by phone. Only a handful of leaders responded to the author’s request for an 
interview. Two interviewees are currently presidents of their security districts – the Lakeview 
Crime Prevention District and the Mid-City Security District – and one is president of her 
neighborhood association, the Lake Vista Property Owners Association. One is a city official; 
another is a former state representative and was the sponsor of the legislation creating the first 
crime prevention and security district in the state. Interviews were conducted both face-to-face 
and via the phone, and typically lasted one hour.  
Interviews were semi-structured. Interviewees were asked pre-generated questions as 
well as questions tailored to them and their unique responses. The pre-generated questions can be 
divided into three general categories or themes: 1) information about the district(s), 2) process 
and legal questions, and 3) theoretical questions, including interviewee’ opinions on the effect of 
the districts on people’s views on taxes and the role of local government, and on their general 
satisfaction with life in the city. Table 1 provides examples of the types of questions in each 
category. A full list of questions can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1: Examples of Pre-Generated Interview Questions 
 
 
Information about the District(s)
Impetus for creating the district?
History of the district?
Purpose of the district?
Crime rates before and after the district was created?
Is the district effective?
Process and Legal Questions
Process for creating the district?
Rationale for placement of enabling legislation within the La. Revised Statutes?
Differences between the types of residential special taxing districts?
City Council's role in the process?
Theoretical Questions
If unhappy with services, why not move? Why go the district route?
Does the district satisfy concerns?
Does paying for a district change view of general tax increases? City government?
Does living in a district affect likelihood of pushing for/supporting citywide improvements?
Do districts create inequities between areas with them and those without?
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In addition to interviews, the study also draws from a public meeting held to discuss the 
possible creation of a new special taxing district in Eastern New Orleans. 
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LIMITATIONS 
 
As crafted, this study has a number of limitations. First, the study uses annual audits 
required by the Office of the Louisiana Legislative Auditor as the source for budgetary 
information on the security districts. However, 2011 audits are not yet available for three of the 
security districts. For one of the districts without a 2011 audit, the study uses the 2010 audit. The 
other two districts without 2011 audits are new districts. 
Second, the study uses census data for the demographic profiles of district residents, the 
homeownership rate and home values in the districts. Census data are aggregated by block 
group; security districts may contain all or parts of a number of groups. As a result, even though 
a security district may contain only a portion of a block group, the demographic information, 
homeownership rates and home values from the whole group are included in the profile of 
district residents. Additionally, because security districts may contain a number of block groups, 
the median household incomes of residents in the security districts are presented as a range. The 
study uses 2005-2009 census data for some of the indicators. This time window includes 
population fluctuations that occurred in New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the 
failure of the levees and flood walls in 2005. 
Third, in looking at whether security districts keep residents from leaving the city and if 
they affect the city’s potential for improvement, this study relies on qualitative sources. 
Interview subjects were drawn from primarily three districts: the Lakeview Crime Prevention 
District, the Mid-City Security District and the newly approved Lake Vista Crime Prevention 
District. These districts were highlighted because the leadership responded to requests for 
information and interviews. Requests for information were sent to all districts with websites 
providing contact information for commissioners or district personnel. The experiences of 
residents and security district officials in these security districts are not necessarily representative 
of all the security districts in New Orleans or of special taxing districts in general. A more 
definitive answer to the question of whether security districts, in particular, and special taxing 
districts, in general, have political and social consequences such as those examined in this study 
would require a more thorough approach. This could include interviews with representatives 
from a greater range of districts as well as a survey of board members and residents in all of the 
security districts in New Orleans. The study would also be strengthened by interviews with 
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residents in areas where security districts were considered but not approved and in areas where 
security districts have never been considered.  
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LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Louisiana has been a leader in the creation and use of special taxing districts. In 1974, the 
legislature created the nation’s first assessment-based business improvement district to provide 
enhanced services in economic development, cleaning and safety.3 Located in New Orleans, the 
Downtown Development District is still operational today. In 1997, the legislature created the 
first crime prevention and security district in the state. Also located in New Orleans, the 
Lakeview Crime Prevention District is a residentially-focused special taxing district that 
provides supplemental police patrol services. 
The Louisiana Constitution gives the state legislature the authority to create special 
districts, to define their powers, and to grant them such rights, powers and authorities as it deems 
proper, including the power of taxation.4 The legislature has used this power to authorize a 
variety of special taxing districts, including business improvement districts, economic 
development districts, neighborhood improvement districts, and crime prevention and security 
districts. This study will focus on crime prevention and security districts.5 
Legislation to authorize a crime prevention and security district lays out the boundaries of 
the district, its purpose and governance, and the method of funding the district. All of the 
security districts in New Orleans are governed by boards comprised of residents of the district. 
Districts may be funded by either a parcel fee or an ad valorum tax levied on taxable real 
property in the districts. 
Once created by the legislature, a crime prevention and security district must be approved 
by the majority of registered voters in the district. The City Council of New Orleans must pass a 
resolution to place consideration of the district on the ballot. When considering the district, 
voters are presented with a timeframe for its existence and a maximum parcel fee or ad valorem 
tax. Voters must reapprove the district in order for it to continue to operate beyond the stated 
timeframe.  
 
  
                                                          
3
 Downtown NOLA, “Your DDD: About Us,” http://www.neworleansdowntown.com/pages/detail/31/your-ddd-
overview. La R.S. 33:2740.3. 
4
 La Constitution Article VI, Part I, Section 19. 
5
 La R.S. Title 33, Chapter 29. 
5
 La R.S. Title 33, Chapter 29, Art II. 
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FINDINGS 
 
There are currently 15 districts in operation in Orleans Parish. Two new districts – the 
North Kenilworth Improvement and Security District and Lake Vista Crime Prevention District – 
were approved during the November 6, 2012 election, but are not yet operational. Table 1 lists 
the districts and the year they were approved by the state legislature; Map 1 shows their 
locations. 
 
Table 2: Crime Prevention and Security Districts by Year of Enabling Legislation 
 
 
  
Crime Prevention and Security District Year Approved by Legislature
Lakeview Crime Prevention District 1997
The Garden District's Security District 1998
The Audubon Area Security District 2002
Lake Terrace Crime Prevention District 2002
Upper Hurstville Security District 2003
Lakeshore Crime Prevention District 2004
Lakewood Crime Prevention and Improvement District 2004
Twinbrook Security District 2005
Touro Bouligny Security District 2005
Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District 2007
Upper Audubon Security District 2008
Mid-City Security District 2008
Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District 2010
Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District 2010
Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District 2010
North Kenilworth Improvement and Security District 2012
Lake Vista Crime Prevention District 2012
 Map 1: Crime Prevention and Security Districts in New Orleans, 2012.
 
It is worth noting that the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District is an outlier 
among the crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans. Unlike the other districts, the 
Broadmoor district does not include promoting and enhancing security in its purpose, nor does 
its budget include expenditures on additional police patrols or other security related expenses. 
The reason for its placement in the Louisiana Revised Statutes with crime prev
security districts is unclear.6 It would be more appropriately placed in the subpart on 
improvement districts.7 Because its purpose does not include enhancing security, the Broadmoor 
Neighborhood Improvement District will be excluded from 
policing services. 
                                                          
6
 La. R.S. Title 33, Part II, Subpart C. 
7
 La. R.S. Title 33, Part II, Subpart A.   
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27 
 
The following section will describe the structures of the 15 districts that are currently 
operational, explore the socio-economic characteristics of the districts and lay out five themes 
that emerged from interviews with city officials and district stakeholders.    
 
District Structure 
 
 Approved by 54 percent of voters in February 1998, the Lakeview Crime Prevention 
District was the first crime prevention and security district in New Orleans and in Louisiana. It 
has served as a template for the other districts in the city. As a result, there are many similarities 
in the structure of the 15 districts in New Orleans. The districts share similar purposes – to aid in 
the security of the area.8 The vast majority of their annual budgets are dedicated to patrols and 
promoting security.9 All are governed by a board of volunteers appointed by neighborhood 
groups and public officials. The boards in the various districts have the same powers and duties. 
Finally, all the districts have a sunset provision requiring residents to reapprove it. The districts 
are not identical, however. They differ in two main areas: how they are funded and the type of 
security services they provide.   
 
Funding  
 
When voting to approve a crime prevention and security district, residents agree to a 
maximum per parcel charge for funding the district. The charge can take the form of either a 
parcel fee or an ad valorem tax. A district’s board can choose to charge residents less than the 
maximum fee or number of mills approved by voters. The charge appears on property owners’ 
property tax bills and is collected by the City of New Orleans at the same time as all other 
property taxes. The City retains a portion of the amount collected as an administrative fee.10  
The City either remits the monies collected directly to a district’s board or pays them 
over to the Board of Liquidation, City Debt. The Board of Liquidation holds the funds for a 
                                                          
8
 Not including the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District. 
9
 With the exception of the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District, all of the districts dedicate the majority 
of their annual budgets to providing security. The percentage of 2011 expenditures spent on security range from 77 
to 98 percent. 
10
 For districts that are funded through an ad valorem tax, the City retains two percent of the amount collected as a 
collection fee and two percent of the amount assessed as an assessor fee. For districts that are funded through a 
parcel fee, the City retains one percent of the amount collected as a collection fee.  
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district until it needs them. A district’s board creates a budget for spending for the money 
collected from residents. Most funds are used for police patrols and related security costs.    
One of the biggest variables in structuring a crime prevention and security districts is 
whether to fund the district through a parcel fee or an ad valorem tax. In districts funded by 
parcel fees all property owners of eligible taxable properties pay the same amount, regardless of 
the size or value of their property.11 In districts funded by an ad valorem tax the amount each 
property owner pays is dependent on the assessed value of their property. Thus, property owners 
with larger or more valuable properties pay more to the district than owners of less valuable 
properties.  
When considering how to fund a district, the issue of fairness often arises. The argument 
in favor of parcel fees is that all residents benefit equally from the additional security the district 
provides and therefore should pay the same amount for it. The argument in favor of an ad 
valorem tax is that it is a more progressive form of funding than a parcel fee. By linking property 
value to the amount a resident pays to fund the district, those that are arguably more able to 
afford the additional cost of the district pay more for it. Two crime prevention and security 
districts in New Orleans – the Garden District’s Security District and the Touro Bouligny 
Security District – are funded through an ad valorem tax.  
 The amount districts charge residents also varies. The Broadmoor Neighborhood 
Improvement District charges the least at $100 per parcel. At the other end of the spectrum, three 
districts charge $500 per parcel. Table 2 lists the fee or millages for each district and the number 
of taxable parcels in each district.  
                                                          
11
 Two districts have two tiers of fees. The Mid-City Security District has a higher fee for properties with three or 
more family units. The Twinbrook Security District charges residential properties more than commercial properties. 
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Table 3: Charges for and Taxable Parcels in Crime Prevention and Security Districts, 
2011. 
 
 
 As seen in Table 3, the larger districts tend to have the smaller fees. With more 
households in the district they are able to spread the cost. However, they may require more 
patrols to cover the larger area or have less concentrated services than the smaller districts.  
The 15 crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans contained 20,084 taxable 
parcels in 2011 – 13.3 percent of the city’s total taxable parcels.12 While a small minority of the 
city’s taxable parcels is located within security districts, the percentage is not insignificant.  
 
Security Services 
 
 The main way crime prevention and security districts promote security is by hiring 
security officers to patrol the areas they serve.13 These patrols are intended to supplement the 
                                                          
12
 According to the Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, there were 151,474 taxable parcels in Orleans Parish in 2011.  
13
 The Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District is the exception. Promoting security is not a part of its 
purpose and it does not provide patrols. According to its audit, the Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District 
did not provide patrols in 2011. Staff from the New Orleans Office of the Inspector General stated that leadership of 
District Fee/Mill Taxable Parcels
Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District $100 2,133
Lakeview Crime Prevention District $110 4,806
Mid-City Security District $200 5,000
$700 if 3/+ family units
Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District $200 1,237
Lake Terrace Crime Prevention District $300 439
Lakeshore Crime Prevention District $360 654
Twinbrook Security District $440 436
$300 if commercial
Lakewood Crime Prevention and Improvement District $450 395
Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District $455 820
Upper Hurstville Security District $485 467
Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District $500 413
The Audubon Area Security District $500 374
Upper Audubon Security District $500 360
The Garden District's Security District 16 mills 1,607
Touro Bouligny Security District 7.8 mills 943
Source: Orleans Parish Assessor's Office
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services provided by the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). Districts can hire patrols 
from either a police entity, such as the NOPD or Levee District Police, or from a private security 
company. There are several private security companies that work with the crime prevention and 
security districts in New Orleans, including Metro Security, Inc, Weiser Security Services, and 
New Orleans Private Patrol. Table 4 lists the districts and the source of their security services.  
 
Table 4: Types of Patrols for Crime Prevention and Security Districts, 2011. 
 
 
 As can be seen in the table, a minority of crime prevention and security districts hires 
patrols from a police entity. Of the crime prevention and security districts that have chosen to 
work with the NOPD in some capacity, three have opted to hire off-duty NOPD officers to patrol 
as part of a detail assignment. The Lakeview Crime Prevention District and the Mid-City 
Security District, on the other hand, have entered into cooperative endeavor agreements with the 
City of New Orleans to pay for on-duty police officers to patrol their districts.  
The cooperative endeavor agreements for the Lakeview Crime Prevention District and 
Mid-City Security District are very similar. Under them, the city agrees to deploy additional 
patrol cars in the districts and to assign a full-time coordinator from within the ranks of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District indicated a desire to provide patrols in the future once the 
district has accumulated enough funds to pay for it. 
District Patrolling Officers
Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District NOPD
Lake Terrace Crime Prevention District Orleans Levee District Police
Lakeshore Crime Prevention District Private Company
Lakeview Crime Prevention District NOPD
Lakewood Crime Prevention and Improvement District Private Company
Mid-City Security District NOPD
Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District Private Company
The Audubon Area Security District Private Company
The Garden District's Security District Private Company & NOPD
Touro Bouligny Security District Private Company
Twinbrook Security District Private Company
Upper Audubon Security District Private Company
Upper Hurstville Security District Private Company & NOPD
Sources: Louisiana Legislative Auditor, 2011 district audits; district websites; interviews with district personnel; 
Aaron Malone, New Orleans Office of the Inspector General.
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NOPD to the districts. The coordinator is responsible for scheduling and supervising the officers 
performing the additional patrols, being accessible to the district board, attending district board 
meetings, and providing information to the board as needed. Each district is responsible for 
purchasing the additional patrol cars that are used in it, for reimbursing the city for the salary of 
the full-time coordinator and for reimbursing the city for the actual hourly rate of the officers 
who perform the additional patrols in the district. The city, however, pays for the gas and 
maintenance on the cars the district purchases. It also pays for the labor costs, labor burdens and 
benefits associated with the hours NOPD officers spend working exclusively for the district. This 
means, for example, that if an officer is injured while patrolling for a district his worker’s 
compensation is paid by the city.  
 The sharing of costs for on-duty police officers to provide additional patrols in a district 
can be tricky. For example, as part of its cost cutting measures the city recently cut the budget for 
police car maintenance. This means that the cars the districts have purchased may not hold up as 
well or may not be repaired in a timely fashion.    
 District stakeholders in the Lakeview Crime Prevention District and the Mid-City 
Security District cited three main reasons for contracting with the NOPD rather than a private 
security company.  First, even off-duty, NOPD officers have arrest authority. If a private security 
officer witnesses a crime while patrolling a neighborhood, he or she has to call the police to 
make an arrest. Police officers, on the other hand, are armed and are able to make an arrest on the 
spot. Second, contracting with the NOPD allows for a continuity of security services. Residents 
may already know the NOPD officers hired to patrol the security district, and vice versa. Off-
duty NOPD officers may be more familiar with areas in the security district that may be trouble 
spots, or may be more current on trends or topics of concern since they are privy to such 
information in their capacity as police officers. Third, creating a secondary relationship with the 
NOPD – through the security district – opens communication lines between the community and 
the police that may otherwise not have existed or have been as strong. As a result, contracting 
with the NOPD for additional security services gives the community better access to the NOPD 
in general. 
 One reason cited by district stakeholders for contracting with a private security company 
or the Levee District Police, rather than the NOPD, is that they did not want to pay the same 
people twice for the same service. Residents create crime prevention and security districts 
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because they are dissatisfied with the quality or level of security services provided by the local 
government. If they associate that dissatisfaction with the NOPD, they may not want to then turn 
around and hire them again. Contracting with a private security company gives them diversity in 
security services.  
   
District Characteristics 
 
 This study asks the question of whether crime prevention and security districts in New 
Orleans share common characteristics and, if so, if these characteristics distinguish them from 
other areas in the city. The following section compares the 15 security districts to each other and 
to the city at large in four areas: household income, race, homeownership rates and home values. 
In doing so, it shows that, in general, the crime prevention and security districts are wealthier, 
whiter, and have higher homeownership rates and home values than the city at large. There are a 
few exceptions – most notably, the Mid-City Security District and the Broadmoor Neighborhood 
Improvement District. 
 
Income 
 
In general, the median income of households in crime prevention and security districts in 
New Orleans is higher than the median income of all households in the city. Between 2005 and 
2009, the median household income in New Orleans was $36,258.14 The median income of 
households in the crime prevention and security districts ranged from a high of $249,375 in the 
Upper Audubon Security District to a low of $15,341 in the Mid-City Security District.15  
Map 2 shows the estimated median income of households in crime prevention and 
security districts. The two lighter shades in the map are census tracts in which the median 
income of households is at or below the median income of all households in the city. The two 
darker shades are higher than the median income of all households in the city. As can be seen in 
                                                          
14
 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Selected Economic Characteristics. 
15
 The American Community Survey provides data on income at the block group level. Because the boundaries of 
the security districts do not neatly align with those of the block groups, security districts may contain portions of 
census tracts and/or multiple census tracts. Because of this discrepancy, this study presents the median income of 
households in the security districts as a range of median incomes.  
 
 the map, in 10 of the 15 crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans the median 
income of households is higher than the citywide median income. 
 
Map 2: Estimated Median Income of Households in Crime Prevention and Security 
Districts, 2005-2009. 16 
Source: 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5
www.policymap.com 
 
Drilling down further, Table 4 lists the median income of households for all of the 
districts. It provides high and low median incomes for districts containing more than one 
group. 
                                                          
16
 Estimated median household income in the past 12 months, as reported between 2005
all people who occupy a housing unit as their usual place of residence. Medians were suppressed in cases where the 
sample of the average was less than 10 of the unit that is being described. Such areas are represented as having 
“Insufficient Data” in the map. ACS employs
250,001 indicates a value of 250,000 or greater, whereas a value of 2,499 indicates a value of 2,500 or less.
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Table 5: Median Income of Households in Crime Prevention and Security Districts, 2005-
2009. 
 
 
As can be seen in the table, five of the security districts contain at least one block group 
where the median income of households is lower than the citywide median income. These 
districts are indicated in red in the table.  
The Upper Audubon Security District is primarily composed of a block group with a 
median household income of $249,375. However, because the security district encompasses both 
sides of Broadway Street, it just barely touches a neighboring block group with a significantly 
lower median income. At $219,000, the spread between the median incomes of the two block 
groups within the Upper Audubon Security District is the largest of all the districts. The Garden 
District’s Security District is similarly situated. The security district continues for one block 
lakeside of St. Charles Avenue and, in doing so, picks up a block group with a lower median 
income than is found in the bulk of the security district. 
The Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District, the Mid-City Security District and 
the Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District contain significant areas in 
Crime Prevention and Security District
High Low
Upper Audubon Security District $249,375 $30,172
Lakeshore Crime Prevention District $185,294
Lakewood Crime Prevention and Improvement District $169,122
The Garden District's Security District $167,875 $29,830
Lake Terrace Crime Prevention District $131,650
Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District $110,000 $83,500
The Audubon Area Security District $107,361
Lakeview Crime Prevention District $103,409 $44,837
Upper Hurstville Security District $100,764 $65,917
Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District $89,436 $16,982
Twinbrook Security District $74,643 $47,500
Mid-City Security District $70,425 $15,341
Touro Bouligny Security District $63,958 $42,440
Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District $40,179 $17,183
Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District $37,813
Median Income
Source: 2005-2009 U.S. Census American Community Survey
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which the median income of households is below the citywide median. The Mid-City Security 
District has the most diversity of incomes. 
 
Race 
 
New Orleans is a predominately African-American city. In 2010, 60.2 percent of the 
city’s population was African-American.17 However, only four of the 15 crime prevention and 
security districts contain block groups in which 60.2 percent or more residents are African-
American. In other words, in general, residents of crime prevention and security districts in New 
Orleans are whiter than the city at large. Map 3 shows the percentage of African-American 
residents in the crime prevention and security districts.  
                                                          
17
 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, Demographic 
Profile Data. 
  
Map 3: Percent of All People in Crime Prevention and Security Districts who are African
American, 2010. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Summary File 1. Analysis done in Policy Map, 
 
 Four security districts contain 
African-American residents as can be found citywide
Improvement District, the Seabrook Neighborhood Improve
Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District
Interestingly, three of these are newer districts. The Oak Island, Seabrook and Broadmoor 
districts were all approved in 2010. 
promoting security; they also promote beautification and general improvement of the 
neighborhood.   
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Home Ownership 
 
 In 2010, 47.8 percent of households in New Orleans owned their homes. In 
crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans, a greater percentage of all households 
owned their homes than did citywide. 
prevention and security districts that own their homes.
 
Map 4: Percentage of Households in Crime Prevention and Security Districts that Own a 
Home, 2010. 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Summary File 1. Analysis done in Policy Map, www.policymap.com
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As can be seen in the map, five crime prevention and security districts contain part or all 
of block groups in which a smaller percentage of households own their homes than do citywide. 
These districts are: the Mid-City Security District, the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement 
District, the Garden District’s Security District, the Touro Bouligny Security District, and the 
Upper Audubon Security District.  
All of the block groups in the Touro Bouligny and Mid-City security districts have lower 
homeownership rates than the city at large. This is the first indicator for which the Touro 
Bouligny Security District has deviated from the majority of the other crime prevention and 
security districts. Of all the security districts, the Mid-City Security District contains the block 
group with the smallest percentage of homeowners.  
 
Home Values 
 
 The estimated median value of an owner-occupied housing unit in New Orleans between 
2005 and 2009 was $174,800.18 In 11 of the 15 crime prevention and security districts, the 
median home value exceeded the citywide median. Map 5 shows the estimated median values of 
housing units in the 15 security districts. 
                                                          
18
 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-year estimates, Median Value (Dollars), Owner-occupied housing 
units. 
 Map 5: Estimated Median Values of Owner
and Security Districts, 2005-2009.
Source: 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5
www.policymap.com 
 
 As can be seen in Map 5, the median home values in all but four of the security districts 
exceed the citywide median. In one of these four districts 
Improvement District – only a very small portion of the district has a median home value below 
the citywide median. Table 6 provides the high and low median home values for the security 
districts. 
39 
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Table 6: Estimated Median Values of Owner-Occupied Housing Units in Crime Prevention 
and Security Districts, 2005-2009.19 
 
 
In eight of the eleven crime prevention and security districts where median home values 
exceed the citywide median they did so by more than $100,000.  
Median home values that fall below the citywide median are indicated in red in the table. 
The Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District is the only security district that does not 
contain any block groups that exceed the citywide median home value. The Mid-City Security 
District is noteworthy for containing the block groups with both the highest and lowest median 
home value for all of the security districts.   
It is worth noting that the four crime prevention and security districts with at least some 
median home values below the citywide median are the same four districts that have a similar or 
greater percentage of African-American residents as can be found citywide. Three of the four 
districts – the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District, the Seabrook Neighborhood 
Improvement and Security District, and the Mid-City Security District – are also among the five 
                                                          
19
 The American Community Survey provides data on income at the block group level. Because the boundaries of 
the security districts do not neatly align with those of the block groups, security districts may contain portions of 
census tracts and/or multiple census tracts. Because of this discrepancy, this study presents the median income of 
households in the security districts as a range of median incomes.  
Crime Prevention and Security District
High Low
Mid-City Security District $1,000,001 $82,500
Hurstville Security and Neighborhood Improvement District $881,600 $447,500
The Audubon Area Security District $744,800
The Garden District's Security District $678,000 $218,600
Upper Audubon Security District $643,500 $201,100
Touro Bouligny Security District $641,000 $322,500
Upper Hurstville Security District $589,800 $520,800
Lakewood Crime Prevention and Improvement District $517,000
Twinbrook Security District $507,100 $420,800
Lakeshore Crime Prevention District $437,100
Lake Terrace Crime Prevention District $392,400
Lakeview Crime Prevention District $309,300 $215,900
Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District $289,900 $103,100
Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District $178,900 $110,800
Oak Island Neighborhood Improvement District $126,100
Source: 2005-2009 U.S. Census American Community Survey
Median Home Value
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districts containing at least one block where the median income of households is lower than the 
citywide median income.  
 
Stakeholder Interviews 
 
 In interviews with stakeholders in some of the crime prevention and security districts, 
several themes came up repeatedly. They are presented in this section not as broad 
generalizations or as findings, as such, but as interesting points worth exploring and as clues to 
understanding some of the political and social consequences of crime prevention and security 
districts – namely, if the districts keep people from leaving the city in search of more desirable 
tax and goods bundles, if they represent exit, voice or neither, and what that means for the city’s 
potential for improving its police services. 
 
A Sense of Control 
 
 The issue of control came up in a number of discussions with stakeholders. Interviewees 
said that crime prevention and security districts offered residents a sense of control. But control 
over what varied. For some, it was specific: control over their own safety; control over crime in a 
city with record-breaking levels of it. But for others, it was much broader than just crime. It was 
about control over a wedge of their political environment. People expressed a lack of confidence, 
in general, in the city government. Creating a crime prevention and security district was one way 
of weighing in, or of taking control of one area where government was letting them down.  
 Freddy Yoeder, a longtime Lakeview resident, who was involved in starting the 
Lakeview Crime Prevention District, said that, years ago, Lakeview residents were discouraged 
with the services they were getting from the city. Police protection, the condition of the streets 
and garbage collection were all sore points. In general, people felt like they were not getting their 
fair share. The idea of secession came up, but was not politically viable. But people wanted to do 
something to ease their general dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the city and the quality 
of services in their neighborhood. It was then that they pursued the idea of creating a special 
taxing district just for crime. While the district was created specifically to deal with crime, it was 
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also about taking action, about having the ability to tackle and fix a problem in their 
neighborhood.  
 Feeling a sense of control seems to go hand-in-hand with having a tighter rein over how 
money is spent. Several interviewees shared the idea that security districts could more effectively 
spend money than the NOPD. Either because the districts are closer to the people, or because 
they are not hindered by administrative burdens and decades of political baggage. It is interesting 
though that some districts would choose to spend money to hire the NOPD – the very institution 
they seem to find lacking in some way – to do extra patrols. 
 
NOLA versus the Suburbs 
 
 In discussions about levels of crime and the need for additional security services, a 
number of interviewees noted that crime rates in their neighborhood were relatively low 
compared to the rest of the city. For instance, Peppi Bruneau, the former state Representative for 
the Lakeview district and the sponsor of the legislation for the Lakeview Crime Prevention 
District, called Lakeview “the Mayberry of Sodom and Gomorrah.” But he said that while the 
level of crime in Lakeview is low compared to the rest of the city, it is high when compared to 
Old Metairie and Metairie – and that those are the comparisons that matter.  
Susan Garcia, the President of the Lake Vista Property Owners Association, made a 
similar point.  She said that when people have had enough with the crime and dysfunction of 
New Orleans they move to Jefferson and St. Tammany parishes. Crime prevention and security 
districts help level the playing field in comparisons with the suburban parishes rather than to 
other parts of the city. Ms. Garcia called the districts “lipstick on the pig” – the districts help 
dress up neighborhoods to make them more like suburbia but still within city boundaries.  
 
Establishing Lines of Communication  
 
 Interviewees noted that, in addition to potential security benefits, crime prevention and 
security districts also establish formalized lines of communication between neighborhoods and 
the city government. As political entities, security districts may have more caché in negotiating 
and dealing with the government than would lone residents approaching city officials. Security 
43 
 
districts that enter into cooperative endeavor agreements with the NOPD have the added benefit 
of having their own coordinator, whom they pay, within the police department. Districts that hire 
off-duty NOPD and Levee District officers also have a connection to the departments through 
those officers. These connections give the districts greater access to the police department and 
the city government than residents in areas that are not part of a security district. 
 For example, when the Third Police District was expanded to include a larger area – 
effectively spreading NOPD patrols in the police district thinner – the Lakeview Crime 
Prevention District was able to ensure that the expansion would not result in a reduced NOPD 
presence in the neighborhood. They could do this because 1) their formalized relationship with 
the NOPD keeps them attuned to such shifts and changes and 2) they already have an entrée for 
airing their concerns. Through the crime prevention and security district, and its formal 
relationship to government, residents within districts seem able to engage politically more easily 
and quickly than residents living outside of a security district.  
 While noting the advantages of having crime prevention and security districts, 
interviewees did not, in general, find the advantages unfair. This is because, as Jim Olsen, 
President of the Mid-City Security District, pointed out, any neighborhood can create a crime 
prevention and security district if they so desire. It just takes motivation to do it.  
Interviewees differed in their opinions of whether the existence of crime prevention and 
security districts hinders efforts at citywide improvements in policing services. Mr. Olsen noted, 
for example, that while there would perhaps be more dissatisfaction with and concern for the 
quality of policing services citywide if the security districts did not exist, there would not 
necessarily be greater involvement in effecting change. This could be due, in part, to a lack of 
faith in the city’s ability to make systematic changes. Mr. Olsen said that he did not think giving 
the NOPD more money would necessarily lead to enhanced security services, whereas security 
districts allow residents a significant say in how and where money is spent on security. Ms. 
Garcia, on the other hand, thought that security districts did distract from the core problems 
facing the city. She said that creating a security district allows people to put money towards a 
problem that is concerning them and, in doing so, to feel like they are in control of the situation. 
However, she said that this does not actually fix the root problems, which include a lack of 
confidence in the NOPD and the city government, and decades of mistrust between the haves and 
have-nots. 
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Seceding from New Orleans 
 
 Several members of neighborhoods near Lake Pontchartrain, which are situated at the 
edge of the city, noted that they, and other residents in their neighborhoods, had at various points 
discussed the possibility of seceding from New Orleans and establishing their own municipality. 
The idea was said to have never gained traction for a number of reasons. One, it would hurt the 
city. If Lakeview, for example, had seceded rather than create a crime prevention and security 
district, it would have significantly reduced the tax base of the city and seriously handicapped it 
financially. Two, residents do not have a firm understanding of how expensive it is to run a city 
and how broad the responsibilities of local government are. Ms. Garcia pointed out that in Lake 
Vista only half of the people pay the Property Owners Association fee. She asked how would 
they maintain the streets or pay for garbage collection if they were their own municipality. 
Three, it’s a political long shot. The consent of the whole city is required for an area of the city to 
secede. Mr. Bruneau noted that if Lakeview could have voted on its own to leave, it would now 
be the Parish of Lakeview, but that it could never get citywide support for such an idea.
 Knowing that actually seceding is highly improbable, if not impossible, may be why it so 
often comes up, however. Because it is unlikely to ever happen, it can be discussed safely in 
moments of disappointment or dissatisfaction with city services or operations. It can be used as a 
political bargaining chip without the threat of actually having to cash it in. 
 Even if secession were a possibility politically, it seems unlikely that people would be 
willing to bear the personal cost and responsibility of potentially permanently harming the city in 
order to establish a new municipality. Mr. Yoder’s response to the question of why, given his 
dissatisfaction with city services, he has chosen to stay in New Orleans rather than move to the 
suburbs or elsewhere in the country, seems to support this. He said New Orleans is his home. It’s 
where he raised his family. So he will take the inconvenience and extra cost of living within a 
crime prevention and security district rather than move somewhere with better city services. 
 
Hyper- Localism 
 
 For some, crime prevention and security districts seem to represent a more surefire way 
of getting what they want out of government. Voting for general millage increases could provide 
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the city government with more money to hire more police to provide more patrols. But voting for 
a crime prevention and security district ensures that one’s money is benefiting one’s own 
neighborhood rather than being used elsewhere in the city. As one interviewee put it – “it’s every 
man for himself.”  
 But this hyper-localism does not seem to come into play uniformly for all types of 
services. For example, in 2010, Lakeview residents voted down a ballot measure to create a 
street maintenance district. The district would have charged residents a parcel fee to fix the 
streets in Lakeview. Interviewees speculated that the district failed in an area that has 
consistently supported a crime prevention and security district because street conditions are not 
as universal a concern or as high-profile as crime. Mr. Bruneau noted that his fellow state 
legislators were shocked when Lakeview, a conservative stronghold, passed what amounted to a 
tax on themselves to create the first security district. He said he told them that they should not 
have been surprised – that nothing is more important than safety of self and family.  
Streets, however, did not seem to rank as high. Some of those opposed to the streets 
district commented that they were already paying extra for the security district and that their 
general tax dollars should be buying something for them. They did not want to have to pay extra 
to cover basic government services. 
 
  
46 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This study seeks to answer three questions about crime prevention and security districts 
in New Orleans: 
 
1. Do the security districts share common characteristics and, if so, do these characteristics 
distinguish them from other areas in the city? 
2. Do the security districts break the link between Tiebout sorting on taxes, public goods 
and municipal boundaries by keeping residents from leaving the city in search of a more 
favorable package of taxes and services? 
3. Are security districts an exercise in exit, voice or neither? And, if they are neither, do 
they hinder the city’s potential for improving security services? 
 
Taking into account the findings presented in the preceding section, this section will discuss the 
answers to these questions and their relevance to the existing body of literature on special taxing 
districts.  
 
Do the Districts Share Common Characteristics? 
 
 The majority of the 15 crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans have 
similar socio-economic characteristics. Residents in the districts tend to be wealthier and whiter 
than the city’s population as a whole. Homeownership rates and home values also tend to be 
higher in the security districts than across the city.  
 These findings seem to support equity concerns about special taxing districts expressed in 
the literature. Specifically, that they may exacerbate existing social divisions within a city by 
allowing higher-income neighborhoods to opt into better services while leaving lower-income 
neighborhoods with basic or subpar services (Pack 1992, Baer 2008). By and large, the findings 
also seem to answer Briffault’s (1997) question in the affirmative: that only wealthy 
neighborhoods have the resources to implement special taxing districts, despite the fact that the 
districts are available to all residents who desire more or a higher quality of services. Although, a 
more nuanced look at the findings hints at a story still unfolding. While most of the crime 
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prevention and security districts in New Orleans are similar to each other and, at the same time, 
distinctly different than the city at large, not all of the districts are. And it is those exceptions that 
are worth discussing in more detail.  
The Mid-City Security District and the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District 
come up repeatedly in the findings as being different from the other crime prevention and 
security districts – and often more like the city as a whole. Both districts are less wealthy and 
less white than the other security districts. They have lower homeownership rates and lower 
home values. The Seabrook Neighborhood Improvement and Security District also differs in 
several indicators from its fellow districts. Interestingly, these three districts are newer districts: 
the Mid-City Security District was approved in 2008, and the Broadmoor and Seabrook districts 
were approved in 2010.  
 The recent addition of crime prevention and security districts that are less elite in their 
characteristics raises the possibility that while such districts may have started as a phenomenon 
unique to wealthier and whiter neighborhoods, they are spreading to different types of 
neighborhoods. A quick look at the two crime prevention and security districts approved in 
November 2012, adds additional evidence in support of this. The North Kenilworth Improvement 
and Security District contains block groups that are less wealthy, have a higher percentage of 
African-Americans, lower homeownership rates and lower home values than the city at large. In 
other words, like the Mid-City Security District and the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement 
District, the North Kenilworth Improvement and Security District looks a lot more like the city 
as a whole and less like the other crime prevention and security districts.  
All this is simply to say that it may be too soon to draw conclusions. The phenomenon of 
crime prevention and security districts is still relatively new. The early districts certainly shared 
characteristics that distinguished them from the city and, in doing, seemed to confirm fears of 
elitism. But time may tell a different story as more and more neighborhoods approve and 
consider creating crime prevention and security districts.  
The trend towards more types of neighborhoods approving crime prevention and security 
districts could represent a shift in how the public views the districts and/or the role of 
neighborhood organizations vis-à-vis local government in meeting residents’ needs. First, it is 
possible that the city has reached a tipping point in the number of security districts. The model is 
prevalent; as such, it is easy to replicate and to sell to the public. Having a security district could 
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even be seen as a symbol of a community unity and involvedness. As the number of 
neighborhoods with security districts grows, other neighborhoods may feel the need to follow 
suit in order to compete with them, or may see them as a sign of legitimacy as a neighborhood 
organization. This sentiment was certainly present at an East New Orleans Neighborhood 
Advisory Commission (ENONAC) meeting to discuss the creation of a new special taxing 
district in New Orleans East. While the new district under discussion was not intended purely as 
a security district, those speaking in favor of creating it listed neighborhoods with crime 
prevention and security districts and said that if they had them so too should New Orleans East.    
Second, the spread of security districts could represent growing or increased 
neighborhood cohesion and the feeling that neighborhoods must look out for themselves rather 
than rely on local government. Recovering from Hurricane Katrina and the failure of the levees 
brought some neighborhoods closer together. This was certainly the case with Broadmoor, which 
coalesced around the issue of bringing all neighborhoods back post-Katrina. The experience of 
uniting around a common cause and getting things done as a neighborhood could make the 
creation of a crime prevention and security district seem more attainable to more neighborhoods.  
Finally, the spread of security districts could represent growing public exhaustion with 
the state of policing services in the city. It could be that residents are becoming more quality-
conscious as consumers, or that the quality of services has dropped so much that even those who 
were once unwilling to trade increased cost for quality are now willing to do so. It remains to be 
seen though, if more and more diverse neighborhoods creating districts equals a louder voice for 
improvement that cannot be ignored. Or, if the presence of more districts and their availability to 
a wider range of residents makes it easier for the city to not make improvements and instead just 
wait for all, or the majority, of neighborhoods to provide themselves with their desired level of 
services. 
In addition to perhaps being harbingers of growing access to and interest in crime 
prevention and security districts, the Mid-City Security District and Broadmoor Neighborhood 
Improvement District are also interesting in their heterogeneity. Both districts are fairly large and 
include diverse populations. Collective action theory – a foundational theory for special taxing 
districts – posits that the provision of public goods to smaller, more homogeneous populations is 
more efficient because there is more likely to be agreement on the bundle of goods to provide. 
Larger, more heterogeneous crime prevention and security districts would seem to miss out on 
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these efficiencies. Yet, somehow the Mid-City and Broadmoor districts were able to gain 
consensus from diverse populations. This consensus – paired with the growing number of crime 
prevention and security districts in the city – hints at widespread agreement on the need for better 
security services and a willingness to pay for them. If this is the case, it may be an opportune 
time to consider a general tax in support of more or higher quality policing services. Although 
people may be unwilling to pay more if the monies are going to be used citywide rather than 
specifically for their neighborhood or if they have a lack of confidence in the government to 
effectively spend the money. 
 
Do the Districts Keep Residents from Leaving the City? 
 
 Looking back to the literature on special taxing districts, Brooks (2007) suggests that if 
special taxing districts are plentiful enough they may be able to provide residents with a tax and 
public goods choice within municipal boundaries, effectively breaking the link between Tiebout 
sorting and municipal boundaries. The findings presented above suggest that this may be the case 
with crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans. It is clear from the interviews that 
Tiebout sorting is a concern. Several interviewees expressed the belief that the city, and more 
specifically their neighborhoods, are competing with the suburbs to keep residents. In discussing 
the rationale for creating a crime prevention and security district, they compared crime rates in 
their neighborhoods not to other parts of New Orleans, but to suburban neighborhoods, such as 
Old Metairie. Interviewees suggested that security districts were one way to keep in the city 
people who might otherwise be tempted to move to the suburbs. Security districts seem to delay 
or halt exit by giving people a sense of control over their environments and their tax-and-services 
bundle. This implies that the presence of crime prevention and security districts do effectively 
offer residents a tax and public goods choice within municipal boundaries. 
 
Do the Districts Hinder the City’s Potential for Improvement? 
 
Using Hirschman’s exit-voice dichotomy, if crime prevention and security districts serve 
to delay or halt exit, it would follow that they are a form of voice. Voice is when consumers 
attempt to change the practices, policies and outputs of the firm rather than simply leaving 
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(Hirschman, 1970). But if crime prevention and security districts are a form of voice, they seem 
to be a self-interested one. Interviewees noted that the existence of security districts establish 
formalized lines of communication between neighborhoods and the city government. This 
suggests the potential for them to serve as vehicles for voice. But the every-man-for-himself – or 
perhaps more aptly every-neighborhood-for-itself – mentality of the districts may nullify their 
positive potential. If they are willing to pay for it, quality-conscious consumers can acquire the 
level of services they want without having to demand systematic governmental change to get it. 
And as they are satisfied on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis there is less noise for 
improving the quality and level of services citywide. In this way, crime prevention and security 
districts may actually hinder the recuperation process by both quieting potential agents of voice 
and removing their threat of exit.  This creates the perfect environment for what Hirschman 
(1970) terms a “lazy monopoly” and may reduce the potential for solving the underlying 
problems that led to inadequate service provision in the first place. This, in turn, could 
exacerbate existing social divisions in the city by creating unequal access to services. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This study asked whether crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans share 
common characteristics and if these characteristics distinguish them from the city at large. As 
demonstrated above, the answer to this question is yes. The people living in the majority of crime 
prevention and security districts in New Orleans are wealthier and whiter than the citywide 
population. In addition, homeownership rates and home values are higher in the majority of the 
security districts than in the city at large.  
 A few of the security districts do not conform as neatly to these characteristics. Most 
notably, the Mid-City Security District and the Broadmoor Neighborhood Improvement District 
more closely mirror the socio-economic characteristics of the city at large than do the rest of the 
districts. In general, the characteristics of the people and properties in crime prevention and 
security districts approved in the last four years seem to be more representative of citywide 
medians than do districts with longer histories. This could be an early sign that security districts 
are catching on as a tool for all types of neighborhoods. Further study could confirm this 
supposition. If this is indeed the case, security districts could provide Tiebout-like flexibility 
within the city. Residents who desire a greater level or quality of policing services will have 
more options. No longer will competition be limited to the city and the suburbs. Instead residents 
will be able to choose their preferred tax-and-services bundle from a variety of locations within 
municipal boundaries. 
 Through interviews with people living in and working with crime prevention and security 
districts, this study explored the effect of security districts on residents’ decisions to remain in 
the city and on the City’s potential for improving its policing services. Maintaining the city’s tax 
base could have numerous positive effects, including allowing for improved service provision. 
However, crime prevention and security districts may muffle calls for systematic improvement 
by allowing the most quality-conscious consumers to pay to “fix” their service problems at the 
neighborhood level. By simultaneously reducing the threat of exit and quieting the potentially 
loudest voices, crime prevention and security districts increase the risk for a lazy monopoly. 
This, in turn, increases the risk for continued slack in the government and in unequal access to 
services.  
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 The topic of crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans is ripe for further 
study. Three avenues of research, in particular, would provide interesting follow-up on this 
project. First, a survey of all of the crime prevention and security districts in New Orleans as 
well as in-depth case studies of several of them could add to the understanding of residents’ 
rationale for creating a district and of what exactly residents see as the benefits and outcomes of 
the district. Is the main reason for creating the district to prevent crime, or is it about something 
more general and less tactile than crime, such as feelings of control? Has the rationale for the 
district changed over time? Was the reasoning for creating districts 10 years ago the same as it is 
for districts created last year? 
 Second, additional study could further develop the idea that security districts provide 
Tiebout-like flexibility within municipal boundaries. A study exploring this idea could include a 
survey of residents moving to and from areas with security districts asking how, if at all, the 
presence of a district played into their decisions to relocate. It could also include interviews with 
real estate professionals to see if the presence of a security district and the additional cost 
associated with it often figure into buyer decisions.  
 Third, at least two studies could be crafted to explore potential political consequences of 
crime prevention and security districts in addition to the increased risk of a lazy monopoly. One 
such study could look into the issue of displacement. An analysis of crime statistics over time 
could shed light on whether the districts push crime into areas of the city that do not have 
districts. Similarly, an analysis of home values over time could show whether home values rise 
in areas with districts and correspondingly drop in areas without them. Another study could 
explore the fiscal impact of crime prevention and security districts on the city. Even if, as this 
study suggests, security districts serve as a mechanism for keeping residents in the city – and, 
according to Hirschman’s exit/voice theory, thereby forestall a loss in revenue for the city – do 
they nonetheless have a cost that could hurt the city’s bottom line and hinder its ability to 
improve services? Or, alternatively, do they triply help the city’s bottom line by forestalling a 
loss in revenue from residents relocating to other municipalities, increasing property values and 
increasing the amount of money flowing to security services citywide? This study could be 
approached from a number of angles, including by analyzing the cost to the New Orleans Police 
Department for providing security services to districts through cooperative endeavor agreements 
and detail assignments. It could also analyze how much money in manpower hours security 
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districts provide and how much of a boost that provides citywide, if at all. Finally, it could look 
at voter habits over time, to see if residents living in security districts are more or less willing 
than other residents to support general tax increases.     
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APPENDIX 
 
This study was informed by interviews with the following people: 
 
• Courtney Bagneris, Assistant Chief Administrative Officer, City of New Orleans 
(10/14/11) 
• Rita Legrand, Lakeview Resident (9/12/12) 
• Freddy Yoeder, President, Lakeview Crime Prevention District (9/14/12) 
• Susan Garcia, President, Lake Vista Property Owners Association (9/18/12) 
• Peppi Bruneau, former state legislator, Lakeview resident (9/24/12) 
• Jim Olsen, Commissioner, Mid-City Security District (10/5/12) 
 
As appropriate, interview questions were drawn from the following lists: 
 
Questions for Crime Prevention and Security District Leaders and Residents 
• What was the impetus for creating the district?  
• Was crime a problem before the district was created? What was the need for a district? 
• Did you approach the city about providing enhanced policing services before creating the 
district? 
• What was the process for establishing the district? 
• Provide a brief history of the district.  
• Do you think the district has been effective? 
• What were crime rates before and after the district was put in place? 
• What do you see as the purpose of the district today? 
• Do you think being in a district means an actual increase in security services? Or do you 
think the NOPD takes the presences of a district into account when making patrol 
decisions, i.e., does it reduce patrols accordingly? 
• Does taxing yourself extra for public services the city typically provides give you a 
different view of city government? Do you feel more or less loyal? Would you be more 
or less willing to approve a general millage increase? 
• If secession were possible, would you consider it?  
• Why stay in the city if you are unhappy with the level of services you are receiving? 
• Do you think living in a security district has made you more or less likely to push for 
general improvements in crime and safety in New Orleans? 
• Why create a security district rather than advocate for more money in general for the 
NOPD? 
• For Lakeview residents: What was the rationale behind the street maintenance district? 
Why do you think it didn’t pass? 
• For Lake Vista residents: Why did the district fail previously? Why is it being considered 
again? Do you think it will pass? 
 
Questions for Peppi Bruneau 
• What was the impetus for the Lakeview Crime Prevention District? 
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• Where did the idea for creating a crime prevention and security district come from? 
• Would Lakeview really have seceded if it couldn’t have created the district? 
• Were there any other residential special assessment districts anywhere in the state at the 
time? 
• Why were crime prevention and security districts placed where they are in the La. 
Revised Statutes? 
• Were there any neighborhood improvement districts at the time? The development 
district would have existed, yes?  
• What do you see as the difference between the three types of districts? How does the 
legislature decide where to put new districts? 
• What is City Council’s role in creating crime prevention and security districts? 
• Do you think being in a district means an actual increase in security services? Or do you 
think the NOPD takes the presences of a district into account when making patrol 
decisions, i.e., does it reduce patrols accordingly? 
• When you created the Lakeview Crime Prevention District did you foresee how many 
other neighborhoods would follow suit? Do you think they are all effective? 
• Do you think security districts have social or political consequences? Do districts have 
more “voice” such that area without are getting less than their fair share of services? Do 
you think the existence of security districts means residents in those areas push less for 
general improvement in crime and safety in New Orleans? 
• Thoughts on the proposed street maintenance district? 
• Do you think residential special assessment districts are somehow undermining local 
government? Or are they democracy at its finest?  
• Do you think people would leave city without ability to have districts? 
 
Questions for Courtney Bagneris 
• What’s your take on crime prevention and security districts? Good/bad?  
• What do you think is their effect on NOPD service levels? Increase/decrease? 
• Do you think the same people who voted for security districts would have voted for a 
citywide millage increase? 
• What do you think is the effect of security districts on crime in the area? 
• Did the areas with districts have higher crime rates compared to the rest of the city before 
approving the districts? 
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